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"Once I Would Have Gone Back...But Not Any
Longer": Nostalgia and Narrative Ethics in
Wide Sargasso Sea
John J. Su

Marquette University

Abstract
Previous criticism has explored how the intertextuality of Jean Rhys's "Wide Sargasso Sea" succeeds in "breaking
the master narrative" of Charlotte Bronte's "Jane Eyre" specifically and the British imperial project more
generally by giving the suppressed Bertha Mason a voice, giving her a different name, relocating the action to
the West Indies, and changing the frame of reference. But the novel's critique of Bertha Mason's fate repeatedly
depends on nostalgic evocations of a past that never was.

Full Text
[Bertha is] necessary to the plot, but always she shrieks, howls, laughs horribly, attacks all and sundry-offstage.
For me (and for you I hope) she must be right on stage. (Jean Rhys, Letters 156)

We need, therefore, a kind of parallel history of, let us say, victimisation, which would counter the history of
success and victory. To memorize the victims of history-the sufferers, the humiliated, the forgotten-should be a
task for all of us at the end of this century. (Paul Ricoeur, "Memory and Forgetting" 10-11)
Caribbean-born writer Jean Rhys anticipates Paul Ricoeur's recent call for a "parallel history of victimisation" by
some 30 years, composing what has become one of the canonical texts of postcolonial studies, Wide Sargasso
Sea (1966). Her rewriting of Jane Eyre provides the "untold history" of Bertha Mason, prioritizing her suffering
over Jane's personal growth and insertion into bourgeois English society. Yet as an ethical critique of Bronte's
novel, and colonialism more generally, Rhys's novel suffers from two problems: its reproduction of what
Veronica Gregg calls the "racialist usurpation of the voices, acts, and identities of `black people"' (114); and the
difficulty of establishing Bertha Mason as a compelling victim to an audience for whom Jane Eyre is a canonical
story of individual growth and emancipation. My interest is in the ways that the novel seeks to resolve these
problems. Rhys shares Ricoeur's sense that narrative has a unique ability to recall suffering; yet she retains a
deep uncertainty about whether readers will share her concern for Bertha Mason, an uncertainty that can be
read in the parenthetical statement of her letter to Selma vaz Dias, from which I drew my first epigraph: "For me
(and for you I hope) she must be right on stage." Put epigrammatically, Rhys's anxiety points to the unstated
challenge for Ricoeur: Can narrative compel attention for a victim who has traditionally been neglected?
An exploration of how Wide Sargasso Sea responds to this anxiety could provide an important contribution to
current discourses on narrative ethics as well as to literary theory. For Rhys's novel speaks to one of the
challenges taken up by post-Kantian ethics: how to establish ethical claims without invoking normative codes or
categorical imperatives. Contemporary philosophers Paul Ricoeur, Alasdair McIntyre, Charles Taylor, Martha
Nussbaum, Bernard Williams, and Richard Rorty have been preoccupied by this question, and all of them have
looked to narrative to provide a means of sharing, debating, and negotiating communal ethical values. Literary
studies have drawn upon these philosophers to suggest three central ways in which narrative assists ethics: first,
it provides a description of the world that we could not otherwise have, thereby making us more likely to
empathize with the values and needs of others (Palmer, Nussbaum); second, it acts against the abuses of
ritualized commemoration by offering the opportunity of "telling otherwise" (Ricoeur); third, it exposes the
ambiguities and aporias of any ethical project (Harpham).1 The second model particularly sees in narrative the
possibility for minority or marginalized groups to tell history in their own terms. Not surprisingly, postcolonial
literatures have provided some of the most dynamic examples of "telling otherwise" in contemporary
Anglophone literature. Their use of intertextuality, mimicry, and catachresis has challenged endorsed histories
of empire, post-Enlightenment metaphysics, and Christian ideals. Derek Walcott, Chinua Achebe, Jamaica
Kincaid, Salman Rushdie, and Ngugi wa Thiong'o all make implicit or explicit ethical claims about literary form
and the necessity to retell the past in ways that do not simply validate existing institutions of power. However,
postcolonial literatures-and Wide Sargasso Sea especially-also explore how narrative can refigure our tendencies
to validate particular claims of suffering and not others; in this way, they resemble the third model of how
literature assists ethics. These literatures remind us that simply invoking notions of justice and ethics will not
address the suffering that figures like Bertha Mason feel.2 Colonial missionaries everywhere considered
themselves to be bringing justice, light, and emancipation, not suffering; Jane Eyre and other novels of its era
likewise explicitly endorse those ideals.3 Hence the challenge for Rhys is not only to "tell otherwise" but also to
provide a persuasive alternative to the ways of reading and interpretive biases associated with British literature
during the colonial era.
My own analysis differs from the now well-established postcolonial reading of Wide Sargasso Sea in its focus on
the novel's nostalgia. Previous criticism has explored how the novel's intertextuality succeeds in "breaking the
master narrative" of Jane Eyre specifically and the British imperial project more generally by giving the
suppressed Bertha Mason a voice, giving her a different name (Antoinette),4 relocating the action to the West

Indies, and changing the frame of reference (Friedman 117).5 But the novel's critique of Bertha Mason's fate
repeatedly depends on nostalgic evocations of a past that never was. Like Anna Morgan in Rhys's previous novel,
Voyage in the Dark, Antoinette expresses a profound longing for the West Indies of her youth; both women
contrast their lifeless and lonely present among the white English against a vibrant past among the black West
Indians. This nostalgia becomes a concern because it allows Rhys's heroines to identify retrospectively with black
communities in a way that seems to confirm Gregg's claim of "racialist usurpation." To explore the ethical
implications of Wide Sargasso Sea, then, we must confront a disconcerting fact: Antoinette's own search for
moral purpose depends on the articulation of a nostalgic fantasy of return to a community that no longer exists.
She can claim "Now at last I know why I was brought here and what I have to do" only after she dreams of a
reunion across the wide Sargasso Sea with her sometime friend Tia (who attempted to murder Antoinette at
their last meeting).
Confronting that fact should not necessarily lead us to dismiss the potential ethical critique of the novel,
however. If we accept that literature can contribute to ethics by virtue of acquainting us with different worlds
and providing alternative ways of perceiving familiar ones, we need to consider how narratives of "inauthentic"
experiences like nostalgia could be essential to the process. Specifically, I claim that Rhys uses nostalgia in Wide
Sargasso Sea to critique the vision of time endorsed by Jane Eyre and colonial narratives more generally: one
that is linear, progressive, and looks to the future for the consolation of suffering. Such a model must conceal
victims whose suffering will not find future consolation, victims like Bertha Mason. In contrast, Wide Sargasso
Sea establishes a past-oriented vision of narrative time. By defining the present in terms of its failure to satisfy
past longings, nostalgia continually evokes images of loss-actual and imagined. In that way, the interweaving of a
disappointing present and a tantalizing, if unrealized and imaginary, past creates something like Ricoeur's
"parallel history," foregrounding memories of suffering, alternative histories, lost possibilities, and uncertainty.
Or, to put it in Martha Nussbaum's terms, nostalgia in Wide Sargasso Sea establishes a different set of
"evaluative commitments" than those associated with Jane Eyre and the imperial project during the Victorian
era. Wide Sargasso Sea differs from Ricoeur, however, in its insistence on prioritizing worlds that never were.
Antoinette's suffering, for Rhys, comes less from specific acts of cruelty than from lost opportunities to form
genuine and satisfy relationships-opportunities that were prohibited by Rochester and Antoinette's own
internalization of colonial ideologies and racist stereotypes. In that context, nostalgia not only counters the
narrative time associated with Jane Eyre, and thereby draws attention to and empathy for Antoinette's
suffering, but it also helps Antoinette to envision more equitable forms of community. My analysis, then, traces
how Antoinette's longing to return to lost and nonexistent places ultimately drives her to retell her own past in
ways that reduce her dependence upon colonial modes of interpretation. This reading will ask us to perceive a
critique of imperialism not only through intertextual revisions of Jane Eyre but also through the novel's
reformulations of its own stories.

Empathy and Narrative Time
Nostalgia might seem like a peculiar tone for a novel that seeks to rewrite a canonical Victorian novel and depict
Bertha Mason's effaced suffering. Yet throughout her narrative, Antoinette opposes a disappointing present
with a comforting and inaccessible past. Early in her narrative, she describes a time in her life when she could
have sought comfort from her mother: "Once I would have gone back [... I to be near her when she brushed her
hair, a soft black cloak to cover me, hide me, keep me safe. But not any longer. Not any more" (22). This same
attitude remains with Antoinette throughout her narrative. Even in the final pages, she cherishes hope for a
nostalgic return to a lost past and lost community: as she stands atop the burning Thornfield Hall, she looks
down into a pool and sees the image of her black, childhood friend, Tia. Poignantly, her subsequent suicide leap
is an effort to establish a communion with her friend and her past.

Antoinette longs to return to a world and a relationship that never were, but Antoinette's nostalgia identifies
Rhys's basic ethical problem with Jane Eyre: the absence of empathy or, to use Andrew Gibson's term, sensibility
for Bertha Mason. Addressing that absence is at the heart of Rhys's and Ricoeur's vision of rewriting history. For
Ricoeur, history becomes ethical only through a process of empathy and imagination.6 The absence of empathy
makes it difficult to establish a victim's moral claims on us, as the absence of empathy for Bertha Mason by Jane
and many readers indicates. Rhys depicts the problem within her own novel; from its first lines, Antoinette is
denied empathy by other characters. "They say when trouble comes close ranks," Antoinette notes in the
opening paragraph, "and so the white people did. But we were not in their ranks" (17). The refusal of the "white
people" to identify with Creole landowners represents a refusal to empathize with or even acknowledge
Antoinette's suffering. The particular biases inculcated by the colonial system in the West Indies prevent such
moments of recognition; likewise, they prevent Creole identification with the black communities on the island.
Even Antoinette's final dream of a reunion with Tia points to the tension created by colonial categories of racial
difference. When Antoinette dreams of finding herself on the roof of Thornfield Hall, peering over the edge and
seeing her childhood home, Tia exudes derision as much as empathy: "But when I looked over the edge I saw
the pool at Coulibri. Tia was there. She beckoned to me and when I hesitated, she laughed. I heard her say, You
frightened?" (190). Her language evokes a childhood incident where Tia had previously challenged Antoinette,
provoking her with the epithet "white nigger" (24). If sensibility is privileged in Rhys's earlier fiction, as Andrew
Gibson argues, "intensely valued as an ethical mode of attending to the world, valued above other such modes,"
it is almost absent in Wide Sargasso Sea (191).7
By depicting Antoinette's fantasy of reunion with Tia, the novel uses nostalgia to identify the absence of
empathy and to attribute it to colonialism. For Antoinette's fantasy reminds us that her last actual meeting with
Tia ended in violence; when the Coulibri estate is burning and Antoinette flees to Tia, the other girl attacks her.
Only retrospectively do the two girls feel an empathy that is born of identification: "I looked at her and I saw her
face crumple up as she began to cry," Antoinette says. "We stared at each other, blood on my face, tears on
hers. It was as if I saw myself. Like in a looking glass" (45). Up to this moment, Tia perceives her relationship with
Antoinette in terms of the colonial economy-she is a black child striking against the white child of former
slaveholders. The consequences of her violence create an awareness of what the two young women could have
shared in a world without racial categories of difference. But this awareness can only be experienced
nostalgically, after the fact. It is nonetheless so powerful that it guides Antoinette to envision in her final dream
a reunion with Tia, not with Antoinette's mother or her caretaker Christophine. Her dream, then, imagines a
restoration that is not possible within her life and expresses regret for the intimacy felt too late.
However, nostalgia does not itself erase Antoinette's own colonialist attitudes. Antoinette reproduces the
tendency of the former slaveholders to deny blacks independent subjectivities; she reduces Tia to the
embodiment of her nostalgia: "I ran to her, for she was all that was left of my life as it had been" (45). Within her
imagination, Tia does not exist as an independent entity but as the remnant of something Antoinette herself has
lost. As a consequence, she reproduces her own role within the narrative of Jane Eyre. Her own dreams in the
first part of Wide Sargasso Sea replay her fate in Bronte's novel: imprisonment at Thornfield Hall and the
annihilation of her identity as Antoinette, leaving only Rochester's Bertha. Yet she has internalized the logic of
Jane's narrative to the degree that she believes in its inevitability, even desirability: "I follow him [Rochester],
sick with fear but I make no effort to save myself; if anyone were to save me, I would refuse. This must happen"
(59-60).8
The sense of inevitability Antoinette feels is a product of a narrative temporality that effaces the suffering of its
victims in order to prevent empathy.9 As becomes clearer later, Wide Sargasso Sea struggles against Jane Eyre's
model of narrative time because Bronte's novel structures its events in ways that shift empathy away from
Bertha to Jane.10 The story begins with Jane's imprisonment in the red room and proceeds to follow her

struggle for emancipation and salvation. And the intertwined narratives of individual enlightenment, colonial
expansion, and Christian eschatology with which Jane Eyre aligns itself draw significance from a vision of
progress that necessitates Bertha's disappearance. There can be no place for her within the world that Bronte's
novel envisions, if only for the reason that Rochester cannot marry Jane until he "divorces" himself from the
obvious signs of his colonial past, including his Creole wife. Jane herself feels little empathy for Bertha, and this
is striking because from the first pages she demonstrates a hatred of cruelty, repeatedly evokes metaphors of
emancipation, and chooses principle over personal gain.11 Yet although Jane notices Bertha's plight and laments
her suffering, she neither dwells on it nor identifies a perpetrator-madness provides her a category with which
to identify suffering without implicating Rochester.12 Bertha becomes not a victim but an impediment.
Even Antoinette's nostalgic fantasies of community and place seem to guarantee her progression toward
Thornfield Hall and madness-a progression toward becoming Bertha Mason. Antoinette's reunion with Tia in her
final dream requires that she leap from the roof of Thornfield Hall, thereby reproducing in action, if not intent,
Bertha Mason's suicide in Jane Eyre. In other words, her own attempt to escape from the social and physical
constraints placed upon her leads her to fulfill her role within Jane Eyre's narrative. Her earliest nostalgic
construction of the past also implies a temporality of progressive time. Antoinette describes how as a child she
sought shelter within the garden at Coulibri, a shelter she longs for retrospectively from within Thornfield Hall.
Yet her description draws upon the Judeo-Christian image of Eden: "Our garden was large and beautiful as that
garden in the Bible-the tree of life grew there. But it had gone wild" (19). Antoinette's metaphor of place thus
guarantees its loss, for the Edenic narrative is also informed by a notion of linear, progressive time. From the
first moments in the garden, when the ban of death is placed upon Adam and Eve, the biblical narrative
conceives of postlapsarian society as the inevitable telos of humankind. In a similar way, Antoinette's own
narrative suggests the inevitability and naturalness of her loss of place, of her exile and death. Far from
providing an alternative to her fate in Jane Eyre, then, her nostalgia appears to insist upon its inescapability.
Antoinette's description of the Coulibri garden makes an important point: Paul Ricoeur's conception of "telling
otherwise" often confirms existing modes of interpretation. Because Antoinette has internalized a notion of
linear, progressive time, her own fantasies sustain an ideology that not only demands her demise but also
denies her suffering. More precisely, the suffering she experiences cannot be interpreted as caused either by a
colonial policy that demands rigid racial separation or by a beneficiary of the policy, like Rochester. Rather, it is
the sad but causeless result of her own madness. On this point, Gayatri Spivak's famous critique of Wide
Sargasso Sea is most acute. Spivak concludes that Antoinette does not and cannot represent a perspective
critical of imperialism:
No perspective critical of imperialism can turn the Other into a self, because the project of imperialism
has always already refracted what might have been the absolutely Other into a domesticated Other that
consolidates the imperial self. (253)
From Spivak's perspective, "telling otherwise" fails because even well-intentioned narratives reproduce
imperialistic ways of reading. If our analysis suggests that Rhys seems far more self-conscious of this point than
Spivak credits, the problem nonetheless remains. If Antoinette's nostalgia is to aid the process of recounting
suffering-if nostalgia is to aid ethics-then it needs to reformulate the ways in which Antoinette and the reader
perceive her experience.

Telling Otherwise, Telling Again
Nostalgia in Wide Sargasso Sea reformulates our readings of Antoinette and Jane Eyre by creating a very
different sense of narrative time, one that is past-- directed and preoccupied with regret. We have observed
that Antoinette is an unsympathetic figure in large part because she is defined within a narrative trajectory that

effaces her suffering. Jane Eyre does not efface all suffering, of course, simply instances in which no future
consolation can be promised. Indeed, Jane Eyre celebrates the Christian model of suffering as sacrifice; Jane
ends her narrative by quoting the final letter of St. John Rivers, colonial missionary to India, before his death:
"Daily He announces more distinctly, `Surely I come quickly!' and hourly I more eagerly respond, `Amen; even so,
come, Lord Jesus!"' (477). St. John's personal suffering is mitigated, even valorized, by the promise of the
continuing development of the colonial missionary project-a sentiment that Jane herself takes as a model.13
Antoinette explicitly rejects this sentiment. She recounts how in the convent:
I learnt to say very quickly as the others did, "offer up all the prayers, works and sufferings of this day."
But what about happiness, I thought at first, is there no happiness? There must be. (56)
Antoinette rejects the narrative of Christian consolation, rejects a "masterplot" that would subsume suffering.
Not only does she refuse to "offer up" her suffering, but she dwells on these moments, insisting that they have
caused irreparable harm. She asserts, for example, that the scar on her forehead from the stone Tia threw at her
not only marks the loss of their relationship but also threatens the formation of future relationships: "Aunt Cora
told me that [the wound] was healing up and that it wouldn't spoil me on my wedding day," Antoinette remarks
to Rochester. "But I think it did spoil me for my wedding day and all the other days and nights" (133). Indeed,
even from the first pages, Antoinette is preoccupied with regret: "My father, visitors, horses, feeling safe in bedall belonged to the past" (17). Notice how this contrasts with Jane's narrative-not only does it refuse
consolation, it denies the future any promise. Antoinette perceives all safety and beauty to lie in a nostalgic and
inaccessible past, and her narrative repeatedly establishes this point. Her regret, then, is not simply a passive
longing but a mode of prioritizing a lost, even nonexistent, past over an intolerable present.
The nostalgic narrative time of Wide Sargasso Sea represents the final development in Rhys's long-standing
preoccupation with time. Time is perhaps the central concern of her previous novel, Voyage in the Dark. In a
letter to Evelyn Scott, Rhys writes that the "big idea" of the novel has something "to do with time being an
illusion I think. I mean that the past exists-side by side with the present, not behind it, that what was-is" (Letters
24). Rhys imagines a model for describing the past that insists upon its continuing presence in daily life. That
understanding is essential to Wide Sargasso Sea's critique of Jane Eyre. I have noted that little empathy for
Bertha Mason is possible within a narrative scheme guided by its progress toward Jane's marriage and insertion
into bourgeois British society. This is true not only because Bertha is relegated to a minor role but also because
the narrative is profoundly forward-looking. Even the concluding image of the novel points to the future-the
promise of St. John's (and Jane's own) union with God. The past functions only as the record of trials on the
pilgrimage toward salvation. In Rhys's terms, the past in Jane Eyre exists "behind" the present, not "side-by-side"
with it. As a consequence, its narrative cannot establish an enduring condemnation nor even an injunction to
remember Bertha Mason. Progressive time proposes a moral order that in Jane Eyre exonerates Jane of any
culpability, just as it exonerated the colonial powers. The past is conceived of as a record of progress, the march
from ignorance to enlightenment, and so there is literally nothing to atone for.
Reconfiguring narrative, then, can change our evaluation of events by changing the way we experience the
relationship between events and their contexts; in other words, refiguring narrative time can alter the meaning
of experience and thereby transform how we understand the history of figures like Bertha Mason.14 Present
events derive their significance from how they relate to particular structures or schemata of the past. Events
that do not fit within a temporal configuration, like Bertha's arson, are almost literally meaningless,
uninterpretable. Reconfiguring narrative muthos or "emplotment," to use Paul Ricoeur's terms, redefines an
action's significance, transforming what a particular action means by changing its contexts-which pasts it
responds to, which futures it attempts to make present. Thus Rochester's attitude toward his "mad creole" wife
in Jane Eyre retroactively appears as the insane possessiveness of a man repressing his forbidden desire, a man
determined to forget that his social status is sustained by her dowry.15 Actions are never independent of the

stories depicting them. As Paul Ricoeur writes, the making of narrative "resignifies the world in its temporal
dimension, to the extent that narrating, telling, reciting is to remake action following the [work's] invitation"
(Time and Narrative 1:81). In terms of Wide Sargasso Sea, Rhys's work suggests that actions can be retroactively
transformed by recasting the narrative describing them.
Refiguring narrative time, then, changes how events are perceived as a history. To the extent that a personal
narrative organizes a collection of events in a compelling and meaningful fashion, it posits a larger historical
understanding. By proposing alternative temporalities, postcolonial narratives like Wide Sargasso Sea construct
other modes of interpreting events as a history. Depending upon their historical contexts, Bertha's actions can
be interpreted in radically different ways: they come from a madwoman in the attic, a feminist subject rebelling
against patriarchal institutions, or an anticolonial hero revisiting the violence of colonialism back on its own
centers. The physical act has not changed-the burning of Thornfield Hall-but how we can relate to it has. Hence,
even to the extent that Wide Sargasso Sea re-enacts what Laura Ciolkowski calls the "commonsense structures
of Englishness," its emphasis on regret, repetition, and the coexistence of past and present challenges the
"commonsense" structure of time that underlies colonial history (340). Minimally, Antoinette's narrative invites
us to return to and linger on the scant details of Bertha Mason's life in Jane Eyre's narrative; in so doing, it delays
and thereby questions Jane's conception of progress.16 The act of "telling otherwise"-as ideologically
compromised as it might be-points to the contingency and constructedness of a vision of progress that depends
upon the appearance of inevitability and divine sanction.
At this point, Wide Sargasso Sea intersects with the grander aspirations of postcolonial studies. Its theorists have
struggled not only to challenge the metanarratives of colonial progress but also to envision a counterhistory
whose central focus is the victims of various colonial enterprises. Toward that end, theorists like Homi Bhabha
and Edward Said have struggled to articulate "temporalities of other marginal 'minority' histories" (Bhabha 253)
or to locate postcolonial subjects in terms of "the history of all subjugated men and women" (Said 214). Such
histories are concerned less with progress (at the expense of whoever does not constitute "mankind") than with
justice. This becomes possible by proposing that history is composed of multiple and incompatible stories. If a
temporality involves a particular conception of how time functions in the world (for example, linearly
progressive, cyclical, linearly degenerative, monadic.), and if every history employs a particular temporality, then
the postcolonial strategy of creating alternative temporalities opposes time itself to colonial history, arguing that
no history can contain or represent time faithfully." While Said and Bhabha do not depend upon nostalgia to
articulate regret, as does Wide Sargasso Sea, they do depend on narrative's ability to provide an interpretive
description of events in order to refigure existing histories. Indeed, Said's call for contrapuntal readings of
colonial history, like Bhabha's call for catachresis, grants to narrative the task of providing connections and
convergences between the colonial experience in Africa, India, and Latin America-a task that draws upon the
aesthetic capacities of narrative to refigure how we perceive the relationship between the past and present so
that the present can never divorce itself from past acts but comes to exist "side by side" with it, to reinvoke Rhys
phrase.18 Ricoeur becomes most useful on this point. His notion of "telling otherwise" can be read to suggest
that the ethical aspect of narrative resides not in the events it describes but in the implication that any event
can be narrated again and therefore described otherwise ("Memory and Forgetting" 9).
The emphasis on regret rather than progress in Wide Sargasso Sea makes an even stronger claim than either
Ricoeur or Said might accept: nostalgia can change history without claiming to depict historical realities.19 If
Said's history depends upon narrative to transform our interpretation of events, its truth claims still depend
upon evoking actual historical occurrences. In contrast, history in Wide Sargasso Sea is defined by images of
communities never formed, empathy never felt, suffering never shared-in other words, history is defined by
what never occurred. Antoinette, Tia, Rochester, and Jane all are submitted to cruelty on the basis of race or
gender or primogeniture, but only Rochester and Jane form anything resembling a satisfying relationship. Our

awareness of lost opportunity becomes clearer only because of Rhys's poignant depictions of communities that
never were. She and Tia were never given a chance to share their experiences and to empathize with each
other's suffering any more than Bertha Mason and Jane were. That points to the key distinction between Rhys's
use of nostalgia and more familiar forms of it, such as those employed by Nazism and numerous nationalist and
fundamentalist movements in the past 150 years: the nostalgic fantasies Antoinette creates are never depicted
as historical realities.20 Wide Sargasso Sea refuses the temptation to depict a prelapsarian moment of organic
community destroyed by colonialism.21 Antoinette's fantasy of reunion does not belie the fact that there never
was an original union between her and Tia. Antoinette's own internalization of racial stereotypes, if nothing else,
prevents this possibility. But for precisely this reason nostalgia is valuable: it recalls what cannot be realized.

Nostalgia and Prefiguring the Present
The foregoing claims, however, argue against the predominant tendency in literary and critical discourses to
associate nostalgia with passivity, self-deception, and reactionary ideals--certainly not with ethics. Nostalgia is a
"social disease," for Susan Stewart, that evokes "necessarily insatiable demands" for a nonexistent origin (ix,
135). For Renato Rosaldo, nostalgia is the tool of "agents of colonialism," who use a "pose of `innocent yearning'
both to capture people's imaginations and to conceal [their] complicity with often brutal domination" (69-70).
Even the strategic use of nostalgia within Wide Sargasso Sea seems problematic, for its emphasis on regret
causes the narrative to prefigure Bertha Mason's fall in Antoinette's childhood: her mother sets a precedent of
madness and imprisonment; the death of the parrot at Coulibri foreshadows the fire at Thornfield Hall and
Antoinette's own death; her experience in the convent resembles her imprisonment in Thomfield Hall;
Antoinette's dream-fantasy of communion with Tia resonates with her childhood attempt to flee her family and
live with Tia. Such prefigurations suggest the inevitability of her fate in Jane Eyre.
Yet the novel does not associate Antoinette's tendency to prefigure her own experiences with passivity. On the
contrary, the refiguring of time and prioritizing of regret over progress that we explored in the last section
depend upon these prefigurative moments. The sharp contrast between Antoinette's first and final attempts to
imagine a place of belonging and a sense of community-the garden scene and her last dream-marks an iterative
process by which her narrative more fully and compellingly envisions alternatives to present conditions of life.
That is, the vision of a "restored" community with Tia-as problematic as it is-- is impossible at the beginning of
Antoinette's narrative; her own racism prevents explicit longing for her black friend.
If Antoinette's earliest attempts to envision place and community only confirm the inevitability of lost place,
exile, and death, these stories clarify what a more successful narrative would need to account for. The use of the
Edenic metaphor combined with her failure to recognize her own racial prejudice and inability to assert her own
subjectivity guarantee that her story of the garden at Coulibri reproduces the plot of Jane Eyre. Her subsequent
attempts to envision a childhood place suggest at least an implicit recognition of this failure. When she proceeds
to recall her time in the convent school, Antoinette retrospectively recasts her depiction:
Quickly, while I can, I must remember the hot classroom. [... I We are cross-- stitching silk roses on a pale
background. [... I Underneath, I will write my name in fire red, Antoinette Mason, ne Cosway, Mount
Calvary Convent, Spanish Town, Jamaica, 1839. (53)
The linking of name and location asserts Antoinette's sense of belonging to a place and with her fellow school
girls. This vision of community discards the Edenic metaphor; shortly hereafter, she will express disappointment
with Christianity itself as an organizing metaphor for her life narrative. Instead of the future-directed
anticipation of Jane's Christian-inflected narrative, Antoinette's story is governed by urgency and a focus on the
past: "Quickly, while I can, I must remember. . ." For very literally Antoinette is running out of time. Within a few
pages, Rochester will enter her world and claim the narratorial voice for the majority of the novel. Yet the

preservation of this fragile and attenuated conception of community begins a process of envisioning the reunion
with Tia that occurs in her final dream. The metaphor of "fire red" thread with which she writes her name
prefigures the fire she will set at Thornfield Hall-the act by which she marks her name in Jane's narrative. She is
capable here, as she was not earlier, of articulating her unique subjectivity with respect to a particular place and
time-a place and time effaced by Jane Eyre.22
Antoinette's nostalgic reclamation of place does not require a patently false or idyllic description. Her narrative
recognizes that she is unpopular with the nuns and that the place itself bears strong resemblance to her life in
Thornfield Hall: she describes both places as enclosed spaces, without mirrors, in which inhabitants are under
continual surveillance and supervision, spaces where Antoinette is sent when a male authority figure
pronounces her mad. Indeed, the resemblance between the two places allows her to project the alienation she
feels within Thornfield Hall into the past, thereby allowing her to prefigure her alienation in part three of the
novel. Her initially inconceivable and unspeakable loss-- imprisonment by her own husband in a foreign countrybecomes representable first by displacing it into the past as memories of childhood bereavement, and
subsequently by using those memories as narrative precursors to orient her present in relation to the "originary"
experiences of loss.
The function of nostalgia in Wide Sargasso Sea finds an analog in Slavoj Zizek's work on revolution. For Zizek,
revolutions always come "too soon" because they need to create their own prefigurative narratives in order to
reach fruition, a process that can be accomplished only through enacting their own failure: "the first seizures of
power are necessarily premature" because the appropriate moment comes when the working class achieves a
maturity that "can arrive only after a series of `premature,' failed attempts" (59). The successful revolutionary
subject, capable of envisioning and enacting the "appropriate moment," is constituted through a process of
failure, a temporality governed by iteration. The subject fails, but in its failure it constitutes more clearly the
possibility for a subsequent revolution that succeeds. In terms of Wide Sargasso Sea, Antoinette's association
with the convent space is possible only after and through her previous failure at Coulibri. Her narratives draw
more upon her own past stories and less upon colonial narratives and Jane Eyre. The prefigurative narratives
provide the possibility of ethical insight because they envision a temporality that places the past "side by side"
with the present, to reinvoke Rhys's metaphor. Prefiguration endows each experience of Antoinette's life with
the weight of Bertha Mason's tragic fate: the parrot that falls to its death from the roof of the burning Coulibri
estate, for example, reminds us that Bertha Mason will suffer a similar fate at Thornfield Hall. Indeed, by the
time we read Rhys's novel, Antoinette already has suffered the same fate. The evocation of the past recalls and
makes present the memories that colonial narratives have chosen to forget. In this sense, Rhys's model of
repetitive storytelling represents an ethical critique: it insists upon remembering past suffering.13 This
insistence only becomes possible after we trace Antoinette's own struggle to discover a sense of moral purpose.
Buming Thornfield Hall (if this is in fact what Antoinette chooses to do) thus appears as the result of a process of
deliberation not madness, and it is through prefiguring her fate that both Antoinette and her readers perceive a
"reason why she tries to set everything on fire" (Letters 82).
Prefiguring the present in her childhood memories employs narrative repetition in ways different from the more
familiar model of colonial mimicry as articulated by Homi Bhabha. Repetition, for Bhabha, points to the
ambivalence of colonial discourse-its longing for "a subject of a difference that is almost the same, but not
quite" (86). Through mimicry, postcolonial narratives destabilize the authority of colonial discourses by
foregrounding this ambivalence. Graham Huggan's excellent essay on Wide Sargasso Sea demonstrates the
implications of this notion of repetition. Focusing on images of parrots and parroting in the novel, Huggan
argues that mimicry in Rhys resists incorporation within patriarchal and colonial discourse by appearing to
submit to it, a submission marked by literal and metaphorical parroting. Ultimately this provides "a mode for the
destabilization of a set of binary constructs (white-black, insider-outsider, and so forth that provide a spurious

rationalization in Wide Sargasso Sea for the self-- privileging practices of colonial power" (655). In contrast, the
narrative repetitions produced by nostalgia are potentially disruptive to colonial ideology because they allow
Antoinette to reformulate the way she perceives her own past. This iterative process of describing the lost
places of the garden and the convent progressively diminishes her internalization of patriarchal and colonial
biases by focusing on the losses they produced in her own life. Nostalgia allows a recovery, if only in the
imagination, of the past that Jane Eyre erases. This becomes most apparent in her final dream. Antoinette
regains a sense of place she never fully possessed as she stands on the rooftop of Thornfield Hall: "Then I turned
round and saw the sky. It was red and all my life was in it" (189). Her narrative quest has finally arrived at the
point where she can locate her memories in a place: "all my life was in it." She experiences the moment in terms
of her own past and not that written by Jane Eyre. The redness of the sky, coming from the flames that are
consuming Thornfield Hall, recalls the imagery of fire associated with earlier places: the fire at Coulibri and the
"fire red" thread with which she stitches her name at the convent. These aesthetic connections between
moments configure her life story as a coherent whole with particular longings and exigencies. That in turn grants
significance to her actions, for they now appear-as Bertha's did not-to respond to her ongoing concerns. When
she sets fire to Thornfield Hall in order to "write [her] name in fire red," continuing the process begun at the
convent (53), the arson becomes her "writing"-not an act of madness, as Jane Eyre will cast it, but an act of
resistance against the history of colonial violence.

An Ethics of Nostalgia?
If Rhys resolves uncertainty about whether Bertha Mason is a compelling figure of suffering through a series of
nostalgic evocations, she concludes the novel by instilling a final uncertainty about her fate. By depicting
Antoinette's arson and suicide as a dream, Rhys leaves the reader uncertain whether or not Antoinette will in
fact fulfill Bertha Mason's fate. According to the argument we have been building, this strategy might seem
counterproductive. If the narrative has sought to evoke empathy for a figure historically denied it, to disrupt the
tragic conclusion of Bertha Mason's life might attenuate our ability to identify with her suffering. Certainly it
disrupts any sense of catharsis.24
The disruption is essential, however, in order to prevent the possibility of equating suffering with the responses
to it. The danger of concluding the novel with the destruction of Thornfield Hall would be the perception that
the act somehow ameliorates or undoes Antoinette's suffering; or worse would be the possibility of creating a
certain triumphalism in the ending. For Rhys, Bertha Mason's effacement within Jane Eyre is profoundly
haunting; Rhys replaces our final image of Bertha Mason-a madwoman whose violence consumes not only
Thornfield Hall but herself-with an image of a woman woken from a dream in which she recognizes for the first
time the magnitude of her loss: the friendship and home she never experienced.
My analysis has suggested that nostalgia is frequently far from comforting; it disturbs us with images of what
should have been. Nostalgia is haunting in that it not only proposes alternative worlds but interweaves itself
with memory so that life stories become saturated with those images of lost promise. At least in Wide Sargasso
Sea, nostalgia seems to exact a Faustian bargain: it allows Antoinette to envision a more life-sustaining form of
community than she could have otherwise but at the expense of casting it as an irretrievably lost possibility. As a
consequence, the moral demands placed upon the reader are both definite and uncertain-definite, in the sense
that Antoinette's narrative establishes her as a compelling victim; uncertain, in the sense that the text provides
no clear sense of what we are supposed to do with this image of her. The uncertainty is only accentuated by
Rhys's insistence that no action can ameliorate Antoinette's suffering-- it remains within our memory
unresolved.
On that point, Rhys speaks most usefully both to Ricoeur's vision of a parallel history of victimization and to the
aspirations of my own study. The ethical critique in Wide Sargasso Sea does not take the form of an explicit

polemic against either Jane Eyre or colonialism. Antoinette herself, we saw, reproduces racist attitudes and
colonial stereotypes. Indeed, she does so more than Jane. However, the novel acquaints us with Antoinette's
struggle to overcome her own internalization of those modes of thinking regarding race and time. In Ricoeur's
terms, what Rhys accomplishes through Antoinette's narrative is nothing less than a redescription of reality. And
since writing Time and Narrative, Ricoeur has increasingly claimed such a utopian function for narrative,
envisioning the possibility of challenging "positions of power" through it ("A Response" xliii). Narrative achieves
this not only by describing past events but by taking "the risk of resuscitating and reanimating the unkept
promises of the past" (xliv). Rhys, however, draws our attention less to unkept promises than promises never
made-- promises of empathy and solidarity that never materialize. For Rhys, no originary moment of promise
exists as such but is constituted retrospectively through narrative, through Antoinette's repeated efforts to retell
her past. And there lies the irony: nostalgia does not provide a false, idyllic past but the impetus for Antoinette
to struggle for a more utopian future: "Now at last I know why I was brought here and what I have to do" (190).

NOTES
I would like to thank Tobin Siebers, Simon Gikandi, Suzanne Raitt, Andrew Sofer, and Cynthia Petrites for their
insightful comments on earlier versions of this essay. I would also like to thank Critique's referees for their
suggestions.
1. Nussbaum argues that literature aids ethics by virtue of its ability to provide a compelling interpretive
description of life: "The point is that in the activity of literary imagining we are led to imagine and describe with
greater precision, focusing our attention on each word, feeling each event more keenly-whereas much of actual
life goes by without that heightened awareness, and is thus, in a certain sense, not fully or thoroughly lived"
(47). Palmer likewise argues that literature contributes to moral understanding by acquainting us with unfamiliar
worlds; however, Palmer also claims that literature can acquaint us with the world in ways that direct, personal
experience cannot because literature both draws our attention and distances us from the object it describes:
"[fiction] conveys both the involvement and the detachment of our response to imagined situations. [ ...] We
therefore experience a kind of intellectual activity that may not be present in cases of actual acquaintance with,
say, anxiety, war, boredom, earthquakes, or bereavement" (203). From Ricoeur's perspective, the ethical value
of narrative comes from its ability to provide multiple descriptions of an event. This descriptive power
destabilizes the authority of institutionally sanctioned histories: "Why are narratives helpful in this ethical
respect?" Ricoeur asks. "Because it is always possible to tell another way. This exercise of memory is here an
exercise in telling otherwise, and also in letting others tell their own history, especially the founding events
which are the ground of a collective memory" ("Memory and Forgetting" 9). This claim is particularly relevant to
postcolonial literatures, whose authors have self-consciously worked to retell the past in terms other than those
endorsed by colonial histories. Geoffrey Galt Harpham's recent book Shadows of Ethics: Criticism and the Just
Society proposes a somewhat different contribution of literature to ethics. For Harpham, the descriptive power
of literature "actually exposes the shadowed, chiaroscuro character of ethics itself, which achieves a purified
view of the ideal through methods that are themselves ethically dubious" (ix-x). In this view, literature cultivates
respect for life in all its imperfections, rejecting "the strict respect for the ethical law that some philosophers
would urge."
2. In a somewhat different context, Wai Chee Dimock argues that justice itself is a problematic concept because
it assumes "ethical primacy and descriptive adequacy" (7). Because individuals have different conceptions of
good and evil, no exercise of justice can ever establish these goals for Dimock. Following Isaiah Berlin and
Bernard Williams, Dimock asserts that there "is no translation without loss [...I nor conflict-resolution without
residue" (7). This insight is useful for our purposes because it helps to explain how colonial missionaries and
Bronte herself could do violence to figures like Bertha Mason without perceiving to do so.

3. The Enlightenment war on suffering, of course, never sought to eliminate all suffering. As Zygmunt Bauman
argues, it attempted to eliminate only purposeless suffering (225). The philosophical and political practices of
the Enlightenment rationalized or concealed the sacrifices of minorities on behalf of the "greater good."
4. As part of her attempt to rewrite Jane Eyre, Rhys "reveals" that Bertha is not the real name of Rochester's first
wife; according to Rhys, Rochester renames Antoinette in an effort to erase all vestiges of her own past.
5. Carine Melkom Mardorossian provides an excellent survey of the history of Rhys criticism. Mardorossian
argues that the study of Rhys's work has been characterized by "a succession of polarizations" between
autobiographical versus fictional sources for her novels, Caribbean versus feminist influences, and the extent to
which her work represents a critique versus a reproduction of colonial and patriarchal values (80).
6. Ricoeur writes that "it is always through some transfer from Same to Other, in empathy and imagination, that
the Other that is foreign is brought closer" (qtd. in Kearney, Politics of Modernity 95; italics mine). Narrative,
because of its ability to mediate between the familiar and foreign, plays a crucial role in making this possible for
Ricoeur. For a more detailed exploration of Ricoeur's sense of ethics and narrative, see Kearney.
7. Gibson at least implicitly recognizes the absence of sensibility in Wide Sargasso Sea, for his analysis focuses
exclusively on Rhys's earlier novels.
8. In arguing that Antoinette's dreams represent her subconscious internalization of colonial temporality, I seek
to qualify Mary Lou Emery's assessment that they give her the chance to "rewrite her own myth" (36). With the
exception of her final dream, I argue, they also represent moments of helplessness, self-destructiveness, and
surrender to an external narrative.
9. By "temporality," I am referring to the particular construction of time envisioned by a narrative. Temporality,
then, is a model for describing how time is experienced.
10. Narrative time is also a central concern of Kathy Mezei's analysis of Wide Sargasso Sea. For Mezei,
Antoinette's efforts to remember her life as a temporal sequence represent her only hope of preserving a
coherent sense of self (197).
11. Jane's narrative evokes images of slavery even in its first chapter, where Jane refers to Master John as a
"slave-driver" and "tyrant" (43).
12. By declaring Bertha mad, Jane is able to rationalize Rochester's cruelty: "you are inexorable for that
unfortunate lady," Jane declares, "you speak of her with hate-with indicative antipathy. It is cruel-she cannot
help being mad" (328). Notice how this rationalization forestalls any consideration of whether Bertha's fate is in
anyway the result of Rochester's cruelty.
13. My reading of Bronte's novel regards Jane herself as suffering from a certain effacement. Her assertion of
unique subjectivity finally propels her into a position within bourgeois English society. By marrying Rochester,
Jane finds a place within the existing social structure but internalizes colonial temporality and thereby accepts
its authority. The novel that began with the search for Jane's voice ends with the words of St. John Rivers,
colonial missionary to India: "Amen; even so, come, Lord Jesus!" (477). Her personal story accedes to the
unceasing progress envisioned by colonial postEnlightenment narrative. And St. John's acceptance of looming
death in the name of the Empire's progress suggests that individuals who orient their personal lives according to
the teleology of empire sacrifice their autonomous subjectivity. All experience becomes subsumed within
colonial experience; put another way, the development of humanity demands the "death" of the individual
human. Vincent P. Pecora makes a similar argument about modernity in general, that it produces "a cancellation

of potentially free consciousness in the face of a social order whose demands for an individual, autonomous,
and liberated subjectivity become paradoxically its primary means of manipulation and control" (3).
14. I am drawing on the work of David Carr who argues that narrative is not secondary or imposed on
experience but constitutive of it: "narrative structure pervades our very experience of time and social existence,
independently of our contemplating the past as historians" (9).
15. Molly Hite argues that the depiction of Bertha's madness as the consequence rather than cause of
Rochester's abandonment of his first wife is the most significant instance of a strategy in Wide Sargasso Sea
whereby the causal relations in Rochester's account are reversed (37).
16. The function of narrative repetition in Wide Sargasso Sea has been treated by several critics. See Gregg, 96100, Ramchand, 96, and Joseph, 34. These analyses focus primarily on how Antoinette's story is prefigured by
her mother's. David Cowart reads repetition in Lacanian terms, arguing that it serves to depict Antoinette's
"lifelong frustrated desire to restore the illusion of identity between self and other" (62).
17. My argument that narrative temporality can refigure how we perceive and evaluate an event bears similarity
to Hayden White's classic argument that the mode or plot of a historical account determines the range of
possible interpretations. Taking the example of the French Revolution, White argues: "The types of stories that
can be told about fit] are limited to the number of modes of emplotment which the myths of the Western
literary tradition sanction as appropriate ways of endowing human processes with meanings" (Tropics of
Discourse 60-61). White's argument differs from my analysis in his insistence that plot structures are governed
by four master tropes: metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, and irony.
18. Said articulates his vision of contrapuntal reading in the introduction to his book Culture and Imperialism,
19. Readers of Ricoeur like Richard Kearney would find Rhys's use of nostalgia particularly troubling. Kearney
reads Ricoeur to argue that narrative becomes ethical only if it "acknowledges its origin an end in the world of
action" (Politics of Modernity xv). On one level at least, Rhys betrays this ideal. Antoinette's emphasis on
retelling regret and loss does not acknowledge an end in the world of action; to the extent that it envisions an
impossible reunion with Tia-a "reunion" that leads to suicide-the narrative seems to reject the possibility that
Antoinette can create a better world for herself through action. Against this critique, though, we can remind
ourselves that Antoinette's suicide leap occurs within a dream, and that her retelling of it leads her to a
recognition of purpose: "Now at last I know why I was brought here and what I have to do" (190). Here,
narrative does indeed appear to lead Antoinette toward action, although the text gives no definite indication of
what she will do.
20. Antoinette's refusal to depict an idealized past appears inconsistent with more common conceptions of
nostalgia. The function of nostalgia, according to Edward S. Casey, is to provide a substitute for the process of
mourning. The nostalgic impedes the normal process of transference by "reviving and maintaining lost
presences rather than giving these presences up and gaining independence of them" ("The World of Nostalgia"
376). Nostalgia has quite the opposite effect in Wide Sargasso Sea, for it makes more apparent to Antoinette
precisely what she has lost.
21. Classic studies of nationalism like Eric Hobsbawm's The Invention of Tradition, Benedict Anderson's Imagined
Communities, and Anthony D. Smith's The Ethnic Origin of Nations argue that nationalist movements in the past
200 years have sought to legitimize themselves through nostalgic evocations of ethos (Smith) or "invented
traditions" (Hobsbawm) that assert historical continuity with the past. The critique of nationalist nostalgia
should not necessarily be leveled at Wide Sargasso Sea because the novel refuses to claim continuity with an
idealized past.

22. Scholarship has registered the importance of place to Rhys's work. Emery, for instance, argues that the
"protagonists in all of Rhys's novels struggle to inhabit a mental or imaginative worldview that comes from
`somewhere else' and counters negative judgments of their characters which they are always in danger of
internalizing" (17); Helen Tiffin points out that Wide Sargasso Sea contests British sovereignty through the
creation of a "hybridized world" (qtd. by Hulme, 73); O'Conner finds that place not only symbolizes states of
mind but also shapes its attitudes (146). These analyses all oppose place to colonialism, yet tend not to suggest a
link between the formation of alternative temporalities and place.
23. Mardorossian provides a very useful qualification to my argument when she points out that the rejection of
linear narrative can serve the interests of the planter class in Jamaica as well as critique the teleology informing
Jane Eyre. Rhys's "disruption of the act of sense-making through an anti-linear narrative is also a function of the
planter class's typical amnesia when it comes to its participation in and responsibility for the history of slavery"
(83).
24. Homer and Zlosnik provide another interpretation of the conclusion that is still consistent with my argument.
Their analysis suggests that by casting Antoinette's arson as a dream, the novel preserves the critique of
patriarchal discourse and ideology as a "secret" (177).
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